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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case Number : 38502-2011
Bonneville County District Court Case Number CV-2010-4397
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION OF MICHAEL
SHERMAN MECHAM,
MICHAEL SHERMAN MECHAM
PLAINTIFF--APPELLANT
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEFENDANTS--RESPONDENTS

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for Bonneville
County
Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, Presiding

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Larren K. Covert
Swafford Law, P.C.
525 9 th St
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for the Appellant

Alan Harrison
Harrison Law
497 N. Capital Ave. Ste. 210
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorney for Respondent
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ARGUMENT
IDOT'S CLAIMS
In its reply brief, IDOT claims that the hearing officer's determinations were in fact
based on competent and substantial evidence on the record with regard to the fifteen minute
observation period and establishing actual physical control of the vehicle. This statement is based
on the case of Kane v. State Department ofTransportation, 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct.App.
2003).
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
LC.§ 18-8004(5) defines actual physical control as "being in the driver's position of the
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving." Pursuant to LC. § 675279(3), a hearing officer's determinations must be based on substantial evidence in the record.
In this case, there is no substantial evidence in the record that Mr. Mecham was in actual
physical control of the vehicle. The officer simply states that the vehicle was sitting on the side
of the road with the lights on. Sitting shows that the vehicle was in a stationary position and
therefore not moving. The only other statement is that the lights were on. There is no evidence in
the record for the hearing officer to base his finding that the engine was running.
IDOT states that "an individual can be sitting on the side of the road with the lights on
and be in actual physical control of the vehicle." Respondent's Briefp. 3. This statement cannot
be true without out additional evidence and findings supported by that evidence. If in fact a
vehicle is sitting on the side of the road with the lights on, the only way that a person can be in
actual physical control of the vehicle is to have the evidence that the engine is running. Without
this key fact, there is not actual physical control.

IDOT relies heavily on the Kane case to support its actions. IDOT attempts to expand the

Kane case to the point that any argument from the failure of the officer to meet his statutory
requirements for a license suspension are denied based on this case. This is clearly NOT the
holding in Kane.
In Kane, the defendant's case against the license suspension relied "solely of a technical
attack upon the adequacy of the ITD's documentation." Id. at 590, 134. Kane's arguments were
that the documents provided for the license suspension hearing were not on a form approved by
the department. Id. The Court held that this type of attack was purely of a technical nature and
did not address one of the five enumerated grounds upon which a hearing officer can set aside a
license suspension. Id.
This is not the same argument made by Mr. Mecham. The argument that there was not
actual physical control of the vehicle falls squarely within (b) of LC. § l 8-8002A(7) where is
states that "The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol." This is not a technical
attack on the forms used by the officer, but a failure of the officer to provide substantial evidence
that the statutory requirements of actual physical control were met.
15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD
Both the hearing officer's and IDOT's conclusions with regard to the 15 minute
observation period ask the Court to ignore plain language in the statement of Deputy Wren. It is
only by ignoring this plain language that IDOT can make the necessary speculations to show the
observation period was complied with.
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Deputy Wren's statement that he was asked to administer the breath test on Mr. Mecham
at approximately O100 hours cannot be ignored. This time would show that there was not a 15
minute observation period performed. A logical reading of Deputy Wren's statement is that he
was asked to perform the test at 0100 hours, then began to play the notice of suspension audio,
then helped Mr. Mecham back into the chair and offered him the test at the conclusion of the
tape recording. Deputy Wren makes no indication that the audio recording was ever stopped
during this process.
IDOT's claim that the most reasonable interpretation of the events is that Deputy Wren
actually began his involvement 36 minutes before the test. This would require a discrepancy in
the time stated by Deputy Wren of over half an hour, a time equal to two 15 minute observation
periods. As argued earlier, a holding of this nature would completely eliminate the requirement
of a 15 minute observation period.
CONCLUSION

It is only by means of speculation and conjecture that IDOT can attempt to show that the
license suspension was proper in this matter. This is not the basis for review. The hearing
officer's determinations must be based on substantial evidence on the record. There is
insufficient evidence in this matter to show that Mr. Mecham was in actual physical control of
the vehicle and that there was a valid 15 minute observation period.
Dated this 10th day of November, 2011.
SWAFFORD LAWP.C.
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